The Increasing Acceptance of the Restatement (Third) Risk Utility Analysis in Design Defect Claims by Perkins, Cami
THE INCREASING ACCEPTANCE OF THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RISK UTILITY
ANALYSIS IN DESIGN DEFECT CLAIMS
Cami Perkins*
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute completed its reformation of products liabil-
ity law in 1998 by publishing the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabil-
ity ("Restatement (Third)").' The Restatement (Third) was a response to the
lack of necessary detail and ambiguity regarding products liability law in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and its authors sought to clarify and constrict
competing interpretations developing among various jurisdictions.2 Overall,
the Restatement (Third) attempted to recognize the emerging trends and deci-
sions adopted by various states.3 Despite its attempt to synthesize a consensus
view, the new Restatement did more than restate the law followed by most
jurisdictions; rather, it set forth new, unsettled concepts and restrictions.
One of the most controversial of these restrictions is the abandonment of
the consumer expectation test and adoption of a risk-utility analysis in deter-
mining whether a product's design is defective.4 Of particular importance in
the controversy, the Restatement requires that the plaintiff prove a "reasonable
alternative design," otherwise known as a RAD.5 Because some courts purport
to follow a risk-utility analysis but do not require proof of a reasonable alterna-
tive design, this Note will refer to the risk-utility test requiring plaintiffs proof
of a RAD as the "Restatement's risk-utility analysis."
Part II of this Note will explain the differences between the consumer
expectations test, a risk-utility analysis, and the Restatement's risk-utility anal-
ysis. These differences help explain why the consumer expectations test and
general risk-utility analysis were abandoned in favor of the Restatement's risk-
utility analysis. This Note will articulate the major arguments that have
* J.D., William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas (2004).
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. (1998).
2 George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087 (2000) (explaining that the objective of the Restatement
(Third) was to resolve the problem of the meaning of the word "defect").
I Thomas V. Van Flein, Prospective Application of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
ucts Liability in Alaska, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
4 See Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability: A Guide to
Its Highlights, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 85, 88 (1998) (stating that no issue brought about more
debate in the Restatements than this particular component of Section 2).
1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. INTRODUCTION ("Section 2(b) gener-
ated considerable controversy [because it] calls for proof of a reasonable alternative design
in order to sustain an action for defective design.").
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advanced against adopting the Restatement's risk-utility analysis. Part III illus-
trates why adopting the Restatement's risk-utility analysis in defective-design
product liability cases is favorable, and urges state courts that have not yet
adopted the Restatement (Third) approach to do so. Based on state court opin-
ions from the past three years, Part IV of this Note will delineate (1) those
jurisdictions that have accepted, or are moving toward acceptance, of the
Restatement's risk-utility analysis, including proof of a reasonable alternative
design, and (2) those jurisdictions that have rejected or negatively criticized the
Restatement (Third), including an analysis of each court's decision.
II. CONSUMER EXPECTATION TEST VS. RISK-UTILITY ANALYSIS
A. Differences Between the Consumer Expectation Test, Risk-Utility
Analysis, and the Restatement's Risk-Utility Analysis
1. Consumer Expectation Test
In developing the consumer expectations test, courts have focused on the
comments to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second).6 This test applies
strict liability - avoiding a negligence standard - by measuring what an "ordi-
nary consumer" would believe about the product in question. 7 The Restate-
ment (Second) suggests that a product is defective when it is "in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous
to him."8 The Restatement further defines a design defect as "unreasonably
dangerous" if it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics." 9 Whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous is determined by fact-finders based on whether they,
as ordinary consumers, would expect something safer than the product in ques-
tion. Therefore, in jurisdictions that follow the consumer expectations test, a
product is defective in design if it fails to meet an ordinary consumer's reasona-
ble expectations of safety.'°
Despite its seemingly simplistic application, the consumer expectations
test has long been criticized as highly subjective, confusing, unpredictable, and
unfair to both plaintiffs and defendants depending on its application.'1 In fact,
the test was rejected by the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, which states
that the consumer expectations test "takes subjectivity to its most extreme end."
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 698 (5th ed. 1984).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i.
8 Id. at cmt. g.
I Id. at cmt. i.
'o Id.; see also Rebecca Tustin Rutherford, Changes in the Landscape of Products Liability
Law: An Analysis of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 63 J. AIR L. & CoM. 209, 222-23
(1997).
" See Donald T. Ramsey, Consumer Expectation Test for Design Defect in California, 24
TORT & INS. L.J. 650, 668 (1984); see also John H. Chun, The New Citadel: A Reasonably
Designed Products Liability Restatement, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1654, 1673-74 (1994).
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Each trier of fact is likely to have a different understanding of abstract con-
sumer expectations.""
Furthermore, one can argue that the consumer expectations test is func-
tionally equivalent to a negligence test.13 By arguing that an ordinary con-
sumer is not likely to expect more than the exercise of reasonable care by the
manufacturer, the consumer expectations test is transformed into a risk-utility
test. 4 Indeed, some courts have taken this approach. 5
2. Risk-Utility Analysis
Other jurisdictions utilize a risk-utility analysis. These jurisdictions have
applied Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) by balancing the danger of a
particular product against its benefits to society. 6 The rationale behind this
test is that its flexibility achieves an appropriate balance among the competing
interests of manufacturers, consumers, and the public. 17
Under a risk-utility approach, courts have considered some of the follow-
ing factors: (1) the usefulness and desirability of the product: its utility to the
user and to the public as a whole; (2) the safety aspects of the product: the
likelihood that it will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury;
(3) the availability of a substitute product that would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe; (4) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character
of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility; (5) the user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care
in the use of the product; (6) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers
inherent in the product and their ability to be avoided based on general public
knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suita-
ble warnings or instructions; and (7) the feasibility of the manufacturer spread-
ing loss by setting the price of the product or by carrying liability insurance.18
If, after weighing all of the factors, a factfinder determines that the risks of
the product's design are greater than its benefits, the product is considered
unreasonably dangerous under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second),
leaving the manufacturer liable. Courts employing this analysis recognize that
this balancing test is similar to a negligence analysis.19 The distinctive differ-
12 UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 104(B) (1979).
13 Chun, supra note 11, at 1674.
14 Id.
15 Id.; see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1520, 1533
(1992).
16 Rutherford, supra note 10, at 224-25; see also, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990) (interpreting state common law to permit a plaintiff to pur-
sue a design defect claim by showing that the risks posed by a product outweigh the value of
the product's utility).
17 Rutherford, supra note 10, at 222-23; see also Dewey, 577 A.2d at 1252 (citing O'Brien
v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983)).
18 Rutherford, supra note 10, at 222-25 (citing Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175,
184 (Colo. 1992)).
19 Id. at 227.
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ence, however, is that the focus remains on the product rather than the manu-
facturer's conduct.
20
3. Restatement's Risk-Utility Analysis
The distinguishing characteristic under the Restatement (Third)'s risk-util-
ity analysis is its focus on the manufacturer's reasonableness. This reasonable-
ness standard requires a comparison between the design of the injury-causing
product and an alternative design.2 1 The risk-utility analysis in design defect
cases, under Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third), provides that a product is
defective in design "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe."'22 Under this standard, a product is defectively designed if its
inherent danger outweighs its utility.23 The burden of proof lies with the plain-
tiff, requiring the plaintiff to prove "the availability of a technologically feasi-
ble and practical alternative design that would have reduced or prevented the
plaintiff s harm."' 24 Because this standard amounts to proving that the defen-
dant could have acted in a more responsible manner but failed to do so, it
strongly resembles a negligence analysis. 25 In addition, while the Restate-
ment's risk-utility test considers consumer expectations relevant to determine
reasonableness, it rejects the consumer expectations test as an independent
standard for judging a product's defective design because that test does not give
adequate consideration to the possibility of a reasonable alternative design.26
Based on this cursory explanation of product liability defective design
tests, it is not difficult to ascertain why the consumer expectations test was
abandoned and the general risk-utility analysis was modified. These arguments
will be articulated more specifically in Part IV.
B. Major Arguments Against Adoption of Restatement's Risk-Utility
Analysis
Considerable controversy has surrounded the adoption of Section 2(b) of
the Restatement (Third). The Reporters of the Restatement asserted that the
rule stated in Section 2(b) represented the overwhelming majority of American
20 See Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey 0. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL. U. L.
REV. 859, 865 (1996) (stating that the Learned Hand test is significantly different from the
risk-utility test applied in products liability cases because the Restatement (Second) test
imposes liability on the basis of what is now known, rather than on the basis of what the
producer knew or should have known at the time the product was designed); see also Ruth-
erford, supra note 10, at 227.
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) cmt. d.
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (noting that the language of § 2 defining design
defect employs traditional negligence concepts such as foreseeability and reasonableness).
23 KEETON, supra note 6, at 699.
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. f ("To establish a prima facie case of defect,
the plaintiff must prove the availability of a technologically feasible and practical alternative
design that would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff's harm.").
25 See Andrew F. Popper, Restatement Third Goes to Court, 35 APR TRIAL 54, 55 (1999).
26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. g; see also Rutherford, supra note 10, at 234.
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jurisdictions. However, according to some academic commentators, the
Reporters were not restating existing law but instead proposing law reform.27
The largest concern of parties opposed to the Restatement is the RAD
requirement. Opponents argue that the requirement imposes an undue burden
on plaintiffs because it places a "potentially insurmountable stumbling block in
the way of those injured by badly designed products."28 Commentators have
argued that, in suits against manufacturers who produce highly complex prod-
ucts, the RAD requirement will deter the complainant from filing suit because
of the enormous costs involved in obtaining expert testimony.29 This also may
deter injury victims from pursuing their claims against manufacturers or
encourage parties to settle prematurely.3 ° This criticism can be rebutted by the
argument that, although additional expenses in litigation are never desirable,
the additional expense is justified because it results in more reliable and fair
outcomes.3 '
Scholars also criticize the Restatement for practical reasons.32 Practically,
the alternative design requirement may be difficult for courts and juries to
apply because the Restatement (Third) contains far-reaching exceptions. 33
These exceptions are: (1) that the reasonable alternative design requirement
does not apply when the product design is manifestly unreasonable; 34 and (2)
plaintiffs are not required to produce expert testimony in cases where the feasi-
bility of a reasonable alternative design is obvious and understandable to lay
persons. 35 This criticism completely contradicts the first criticism. Commenta-
tors cannot logically criticize the alleged high burden of the reasonable alterna-
tive design requirement, and then turn around and criticize the elements of the
27 Popper, supra note 25, at 55; see also, e.g., Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before
the Foundation Is Prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability Section
2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 279 (1997); Frank J. Vandall, The
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability: Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative
Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407 (1994); John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New
Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Products
Liability Design Defects - A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L.
REv. 493 (1996); Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability: The Next Act, 26 HOFsTRA L. REV.
761 (1998); David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 286 (1998);
Robert E. Keeton, Warning Defect: Origins, Policies, and Directions, 30 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 367, 397-98 (1997).
28 Note, Just What You'd Expect: Professor Henderson's Redesign of Product's Liability,
111 HARV. L. REv. 2366, 2373 (1998) [hereinafter Just What You'd Expect]; see also
Vautour v. Body Masters Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H. 2001).
29 See Just What You'd Expect, supra note 28, at 2373; see also Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1183.
30 See Popper, supra note 25, at 56; Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Defining the Boundaries of
"Alternative Design" Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: The Nature and Role of Sub-
stitute Products in Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN. L. REv. 329, 336 (1995) (stating that
additional litigation costs may have the effect of immunizing defendants from all but a few
substantial claims).
31 See Rutherford, supra note 10, at 243.
32 Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1183.
33 Id.
34 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. e; see also Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1183.
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. f; see also Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1183.
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Restatement (Third) that minimize the burden because the exceptions "intro-
duce even more complex issues for judges and juries to unravel." 36
A final criticism is that the Restatement (Third) is a retrogression in prod-
ucts liability because it returns to negligence concepts by placing the burden on
the plaintiff.37 Pro-consumer advocates present this argument because the
Restatement (Second) relieved plaintiffs from proving negligence on the part of
the manufacturer. By focusing on the product itself, however, the consumer
expectations test unfairly made it easier to obtain a recovery for the plaintiff,
regardless of whether the manufacturer exercised the utmost care.
Part III will demonstrate that states are beginning to see through these
illogical attacks and accept the wisdom and functionality of the Restatement
(Third)'s risk-utility analysis.
III. BENEFITS OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)'s RIsK-UTILITY ANALYSIS AND
THE ARGUMENT THAT STATES SHOULD ADOPT
The Restatement's risk-utility analysis provides the fairest means of
weighing the competing interests inherent in design defect product liability
cases. The ultimate goal of any litigation is to ensure that those individuals
who have truly suffered harm or injury are compensated. The Restatement's
risk-utility analysis effectuates this goal while still protecting a manufacturer
who has acted reasonably to protect the consumer's safety. By considering the
advantages and disadvantages of the design in question and the availability of a
reasonable alternative design, the Restatement's risk-utility analysis strikes the
appropriate balance.
The reasonable alternative design requirement is not the stumbling block
that courts and commentators rejecting the Restatement's risk-utility analysis
allege. In fact, as the Reporters demonstrated in the empirical evidence used to
support the Restatement's new standard, there are a myriad of examples where
RAD tests have resulted in a plaintiffs verdict.38 From a practical, trial, and
evidentiary perspective, proof of a safer alternative design would present a
more persuasive and compelling case than one without such proof.3 9 Indeed,
personal injury lawyers (including many who severely criticize the Restatement
(Third) test) admit that when trying a design defect case, they usually show the
jury an alternative, safer design. Without this showing, personal injury lawyers
know that the jury is left without any guidance.4n
36 Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1184.
17 See Vargo, supra note 27; Patrick Lavelle, Crashing into Proof of a Reasonable Alterna-
tive Design: The Fallacy of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 38 DUQ. L.
REV. 1059 (2000); Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability:
Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENNmS. L REV. 1407
(1994); Angela C. Rushton, Design Defects Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reas-
sessment of Strict Liability and the Goals of a Functional Approach, 45 EMORY L.J. 389
(1996).
38 See James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Prod-
uct Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 914-17 (1998); see also Victor E. Schwartz, The Role
of the Restatement in the Tort Reform Movement: The Restatement, Third, Torts: Products
Liability: A Model of Fairness and Balance, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41, 44 (2000).
39 Van Flein, supra note 3, at 29.
4o See Schwartz, supra note 38, at 44.
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Besides actually aiding consumers, the RAD requirement is not nearly as
burdensome as pro-consumer commentators suggest. The plaintiff is not
required to produce a prototype of the alternatively designed product. As the
cases discussed in this Note demonstrate, plaintiffs can use expert testimony to
show a reasonable alternative design. The plaintiff can also establish a safer
alternative design through "other products already available on the market
[that] may serve the same or very similar function at lower risk and at compara-
ble cost."'" Rather than developing an entirely new alternative design, a plain-
tiff may utilize these products to serve as reasonable alternatives to the product
in question.4 2
In addition, the impact of the RAD requirement is substantially less when
read as a whole. Sections 3 and 4 of the Restatement (Third) overlay some-
what, possibly excusing the plaintiff from having to establish a reasonable
alternative design when a defect may be inferred through a res ipsa loquitur
analysis (§ 3) 4 1 or where the product fails to comply with a product-safety stat-
ute or regulation (§ 4). 44 In fact, the Reporters warned that overzealous advo-
cates might seek to focus the attention of the court on Section 2(b) alone rather
than reading the Restatement (Third) as a whole. 45 As illustrated in Part IV,
courts that decline to accept the Restatement (Third) engage in precisely this
kind of fragmented reading.
Jurisdictions that decline to adopt the Restatement's risk-utility analysis
express concern about abandoning the longstanding application of a consumer
expectations test.4 6 However, under the Restatement's risk-utility analysis,
consumer expectations are still relevant. The Restatement (Third) allows a
consumer's expectations to establish the foreseeability and risk of harm under
the risk portion of the risk-benefit test.4 7 While not an independent standard,
consumer expectations "may still substantially influence or even be ultimately
determinative on risk-utility balancing. 48
Moreover, abandoning the consumer expectations test as an independent
standard is logical because, as an independent standard, consumer expectations
do not take into account whether the manufacturer could implement the pro-
posed alternative design at a reasonable cost or provide overall safety.49 While
4" See Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 7 P.3d 795, 800 (Wash. 2000); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmts. d & f; ("How the defendant's design compares
with other, competing designs in actual use is [also] relevant to the issue of whether the
defendant's design is defective.").
42 See Ruiz-Guzman, 7 P.3d at 800; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmts. d &
f.
" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3; see also Halliday v. Strum, 792 A.2d 1145,
1155 (Md. 2002).
4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4; see also Halliday, 792 A.2d at 1155.
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. INTRODUCTION ("Overzealous advocates
may seek to focus the attention of the courts on § 2(b) alone. Users of this Restatement are
cautioned against such a fragmented reading.").
46 See, e.g., Wortel v. Somerset Indus., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1211 (111. App. Ct. 2002); Delaney
v. Deer & Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000); Halliday, 792 A.2d at 1145; Green v. Smith &
Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001).
47 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. g.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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a small core of scholars support the consumer expectations test, a far greater
number of scholars sharply criticize the test due to its unworkable and unpre-
dictable nature.5" Scholars also suggest that, in reality, the consumer expecta-
tion test does little to distinguish strict liability from ordinary negligence.51
Even though courts resistant to the Restatement (Third) advocate strict liability
principles - because a consumer would likely expect the manufacturer to exer-
cise reasonable care in designing the product - the consumer expectations test
functions as a negligence test.52
Finally, the Restatement's risk-utility analysis facilitates predictability.
Based on variance among states, and vast interpretations of the previous
Restatement (Second) regarding design defects, a consistent approach to guide
manufacturers, consumers, and courts alike was impossible prior the Restate-
ment (Third) risk-utility analysis.
IV. THE INCREASING ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESTATEMENT'S RISK-UTILITY
ANALYSIS: A JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS
Despite the assertion that the Restatement (Third) goes against the weight
of authority in most jurisdictions,54 in the six years following its controversial
release, a number of jurisdictions have agreed with the logic set forth in Section
2(b). Many courts have either expressly adopted the section, including requir-
ing proof of a reasonable alternative design, or have at least expressly recog-
nized the Restatement (Third), hence validating it. Of the jurisdictions that
continue to explicitly or implicitly reject the risk-utility analysis set forth by the
Restatement (Third), the courts provide little justification for their holdings and
bind themselves by nothing other than outdated precedent.
A. Jurisdictions that Accept or Positively Recognize the Restatement's Risk-
Utility Analysis
The following states have either expressly accepted the Restatement's
risk-utility analysis or relied on the Restatement (Third) as support for conclu-
sions in design defect cases.
1. California
Recently, a California Court of Appeals expressly recognized the useful-
ness of the Restatement (Third) relating to consumer expectations. 55 Depend-
ing on the circumstances, California courts have traditionally allowed two
50 James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product
Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 904 (1998).
11 See Keith Miller, Design Defect Litigation in Iowa: The Myths of Strict Liability, 40
DRAKE L. REV. 465, 473-74 (1991); see also Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159,
167 (Iowa 2002).
52 Miller, supra note 51, at 473-74.
" See Chun, supra note 11, at 1674 (stating that a consistent approach to defective design
can hardly be hoped for under the consumer expectations approach because different juris-
dictions can and do apply it differently); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understand-
ing Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 479 (1979).
14 Lavelle, supra note 37, at 1067.
55 Morson v. Super. Ct., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 352 (Cal. App Dep't Super. Ct. 2001).
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alternative ways to prove a design defect. 56 When the everyday use of a prod-
uct leads to a conclusion that the product's design violated minimum safety
standards and is therefore defective, an expert opinion pertaining to the design
merits may not be necessary.57 Under these particular circumstances, Califor-
nia permits the consumer expectations test. In all other circumstances, if "the
benefits of the... design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design,"
the product is not defective.58
In Morson v. Superior Court,59 the issue involved alleged defectively
designed latex gloves, which caused the plaintiffs to develop allergies.6 °
Though plaintiffs argued that the consumer expectations test was the appropri-
ate standard, the court cited the Restatement (Third) Section 2(b) to support its
rationale that a product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks could
have been reduced or avoided by adopting a reasonable alternative design. 61
The court then discussed comment (g) to Section 2(b) to explain why consumer
expectations do not constitute an independent standard for judging the defec-
tiveness of product designs.62 In concluding that the plaintiffs' expectations as
consumers ordinarily do not play a determinative role in establishing defective-
ness, the court acknowledged support for its conclusion by citing the relevancy
of consumer expectations as set forth in the Restatement (Third).63
In another 2001 case, the Los Angeles County Superior Court refused to
grant the defendant cigarette manufacturer a new trial, largely because the
plaintiff's experts presented reasonable alternative cigarette designs that would
have been safer and would have reduced risks. 64 The court reasoned that the
jury instructions referred to the risks and benefits inherent in the design, not the
product itself. Therefore, the plaintiff's proof of the existence of a safer ciga-
rette design that could have reduced the risk of harm was sufficient.65 In vali-
dating this reasoning, the court again cited to Section 2 of the Restatement
(Third).6 6
These opinions are particularly significant because California previously
formally rejected the RAD requirement, either by placing no value in it or by
giving it limited relevance. 67 Although neither of these California court opin-
ions expressly require proof of a reasonable alternative design or reject the
consumer expectations test in all circumstances, the courts' reliance on the
Restatement (Third) principles, and specific recognition of proof of a RAD,
56 See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 311 (Cal. 1994); see also Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432 (Cal. 1978).
51 See Soule, 882 P.2d at 308; see also Morson, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350.
5' Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432.
59 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2001).
60 Id. at 345.
61 Id. at 351-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b)).
62 Id. (the court's citation of the Restatement (Third) comprises nearly an entire page of the
opinion).
63 Id. at 358 ("We are also supported in this conclusion by the narrow view of the use of the
consumer expectations test set forth in the Restatement Third of Torts...").
64 Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2001 WL 1894403, *9 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.Ct. 2001).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See Popper, supra note 25, at 60.
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lead to the conclusion that the California courts are well on the way to
accepting the Restatement's risk-utility analysis.
2. Florida
While not discussing proof of the Restatement's RAD requirement at
length, a Florida district court opinion cited the Restatement (Third) Section 2
verbatim in defining categories of product defects, including design defects.68
The court concluded that the case at issue was similar to cases suggested by the
Restatement, "where fairness requires the consumer to bear appropriate respon-
sibility for proper product use, in order to prevent careless users and consumers
from being subsidized by more careful users."69 The recognition of the
Restatement (Third) categories of product defects, including product designs
where the risks could have been reduced by the adoption of a reasonable alter-
native design, supports the conclusion that when a plaintiff claims a product is
defectively designed, the plaintiff must offer proof of a RAD.
3. Georgia
The Georgia Supreme Court cited Section 2 of the Restatement (Third) to
support its conclusion that the appropriate analysis in defective design cases is
whether the defendant failed to adopt a reasonable alternative design that would
have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm presented by the product.7" The
court acknowledged that there is not a significant distinction between negli-
gence and strict liability for purposes of the risk-utility analysis, but maintained
that the "heart" of a design defect case is the reasonableness of selecting from
among alternative product designs and adopting the safest, most feasible
design.7 ' One concurring justice specifically noted that, even after a plaintiff
has presented a reasonable, safer, alternative design, he or she is not automati-
cally entitled to a jury trial because Georgia law does not require manufacturers
to ensure that their product designs are incapable of producing injury.72
This express positive recognition of the Restatement (Third) and reasona-
ble alternative design requirement will likely affect Georgia's neighboring
states' acceptance of the Restatement's risk-utility analysis.
4. Iowa
In 2002, the Supreme Court of Iowa dropped its use of the consumer
expectation test and expressly adopted the Restatement's risk-utility analysis.7 3
The court endorsed the Restatement's wisdom, recognizing that, while strict
liability is appropriate in manufacturing defect cases, negligence principles are
more suitable for other defective product claims.74 The court also validated the
Restatement (Third)'s comments relating to consumer expectations, concluding
that consumer expectations are influential on risk-utility analysis in deciding
68 Brassell v. K-Mart Corp., 765 So. 2d 235, 237-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
69 Id. at 238.
70 Jones v. Nordictrack, Inc., 550 S.E.2d 101, 103-04 (Ga. 2001).
71 Id. at 104.
72 Id.
13 Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002).
74 Id. at 168.
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whether the omission of a proposed alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe. 5
Because Iowa expressly adopted this portion of the Restatement (Third), a
plaintiffs proof of a reasonable alternative design is now required in Iowa.
.5. Michigan
The Michigan Court of Appeals' most recent opinion on point76 specifi-
cally cites to the Restatement (Third), Section 2, to support its view that the risk
of the product design at issue could have been reduced or avoided by a reasona-
ble alternative design.7 7 Because the plaintiffs presented an expert witness who
testified about various alternative designs, which were superior to the defen-
dant's design and reasonably available to the defendant, the court affirmed the
trial court's verdict and damage award on the plaintiffs' negligent design
claim.
7 8
Once again, the court's citation to the Restatement (Third) in this design
defect action shows specific recognition of the validity of the Restatement's
risk-utility analysis.
6. New Jersey
While affirming that the plaintiff has the ultimate burden to prove that the
defendant's product is defective, the Supreme Court of New Jersey specifically
cited to the Restatement (Third), including the comment requiring plaintiffs
proof of a RAD. 79 The court used the case to explain the overlap between New
Jersey's statute and the Restatement (Third) Section 2(b) and how the two stan-
dards appropriately function together.80 New Jersey's statute provides that if a
defendant can prove there was no reasonable alternative design, the defendant
cannot be held liable.8" The court explained that this defense is absolute, not
just a risk-utility factor. 82 Furthermore, consistent with the Restatement
(Third), the plaintiff is required to show the existence of a reasonable alterna-
tive design.8 3 However, if the defendant shows that there is not a practical and
technically feasible design alternative, the jury does not have to weigh the
plaintiffs proposed design against the defendant's.84 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the Restatement (Third) analysis and the New Jersey state-of-the-art
test are similar.85
The court's effort to reconcile its statute, which at first glance may have
seemed irreconcilable, is evidence of its strong support of the Restatement
(Third) and its risk-utility analysis.
7 Id. at 170-71.
76 See Smrekar v. Jeep Corp., 2001 WL 792476 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); see also Popper,
supra note 25, at 60.
77 Grostic v. Agco Corp., 2003 WL 124309, *5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
78 Id. at *10.
71 Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., 751 A.2d 518, 520 (N.J. 2000).
80 Id. at 521.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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7. Texas
A Texas statute specifically requires that the plaintiff have proof of a rea-
sonable alternative design.86 Therefore, it is also included in the next section,
which delineates jurisdictions that recognize the RAD requirement but do not
refer to the Restatement (Third). Despite the specific statute on point, the
Texas Supreme Court recognized that the Restatement (Third) also makes a
reasonable alternative design a prerequisite to design-defect liability.87 The
court also asserted that the law in most jurisdictions is consistent with this
approach.88 As discussed previously, this assertion has been hotly contested.89
Regardless of whether the statement was true or false at the time, specific rec-
ognition of the Restatement (Third) and its approach to design defect liability
only strengthens its authority.
8. Washington
In a 2000 en banc opinion, the Supreme Court of Washington cited the
Restatement (Third) Section 2 as persuasive authority regarding reasonable
alternative designs. 90 The court stated: "if another product can more safely
serve the same purpose as the challenged product at a comparable cost and in a
similar manner, a jury should be able to conclude that the risks of the chal-
lenged product outweigh its utility." 91 The court concluded that, consistent
with comment (f) to Restatement (Third) Section 2, the plaintiff could "satisfy
the requirement of showing an adequate alternative design by showing that
other products can more safely serve the same function as the challenged
product." 92
Although the court did not require plaintiff s proof of a reasonable alterna-
tive design in all cases, this increasing recognition of the Restatement (Third)
may indicate of the course of action Washington will pursue in the future.
B. Jurisdictions that Require or Recognize the Reasonable Alternative
Design Requirement but Do Not Specifically Refer to the Restatement
(Third)
Although some of the following states do not explicitly require proof of a
reasonable alternative design, these states recently have recognized that proof
of a RAD is admissible, relevant, and in some cases, necessary, in assessing the
defectiveness of a product's design. Some of these jurisdictions even acknowl-
edge that most cases turn on proof of a reasonable alternative design. This
recognition implicitly commits the court to the requirement of a reasonable
alternative design.93 The requirement is implicit because if the court deter-
mines that proof of a RAD is relevant, and the plaintiff does not provide such
86 See TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001-.006 (Vernon 2003).
87 Hernandez v Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 256-57 (Tex. 1999).
88 Id. at 257.
89 See supra note 27.
90 Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 7 P.3d 795, 800 (Wash. 2000).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 801.
93 See supra note 37.
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proof, the case is substantially weakened.94 If proof of a RAD is implicitly
required, the Restatement's risk-utility analysis is essentially approved.
In addition, this Note groups the last states in this section because they
each have a statute that requires a showing of reasonable alternative design,
which is consistent with the Restatement's risk-utility analysis. Because the
state statute is mandatory authority, these states need not specifically cite to the
Restatement (Third) for support.
1. Massachusetts
A Massachusetts appellate court determined that, in order for a plaintiffs
testimony to be relevant, the testimony needed to be coupled with evidence of
reasonable design alternatives.9 5 The plaintiff deliveryman testified that the
supermarket's transfer-loading dock was not at an appropriate level, contained
unsafe steps, and created a uniquely dangerous situation.96 Because the matter
was technically beyond the scope of ordinary experience, the court required the
plaintiff to present expert testimony of a reasonable alternative design.97 Oth-
erwise, a fact finder could not conclude that the mere presence of the steps or
the lack of a raised loading dock constituted a negligent design.98
Therefore, even though the Massachusetts court did not specifically refer
to the Restatement's risk-utility analysis, its requirement of a reasonable alter-
native design directly supports the Restatement (Third).
2. New Jersey
While observing that the jury employs a risk-utility analysis utilizing fac-
tors that are relevant to a particular case, the Superior Court of New Jersey
confirmed that "the issue upon which most claims will turn is proof b) the
plaintiff of a reasonable alternative design, the commission of which renders
the product not reasonably safe." 99 As discussed previously, this recognition
implicitly employs the Restatement's risk-utility analysis.
3. Oregon
The most recent opinion on point by the Supreme Court of Oregon reiter-
ated that the plaintiffs theory under Oregon statute is based on a consumer
expectations test: that the product is unreasonably dangerous because it failed
to perform as the ordinary consumer expects."°  However, the Oregon
Supreme Court decided to "leave for another day" the question of under what
circumstances a plaintiff must have evidence related to a risk utility analysis,
including proof that a practicable and feasible design alternative design was
available. 101
94 See supra note 37.
" Sampson v. Shaw's Supermarket, Inc., 2000 WL 426207, *2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Saldana v. Michael Weinig, Inc., 766 A.2d 304, 311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
"o McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 22 P.3d 320, 333 (Or. 2001).
'o' Id. at 331-32. The court stated:
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Similar to the previously mentioned states, it can be inferred from the
court's statement that proof of a reasonable alternative design may be an abso-
lute requirement in some cases. This is consistent with the Restatement's risk-
utility analysis for all design defect cases.
4. Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas
In Mississippi, a plaintiff alleging a defective design must show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that, at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control, a feasible design alternative existed that would have a reasonable
probability of preventing the harm.'° 2 A feasible design alternative is a design
that would have a reasonable probability of preventing the harm without
impairing the utility, usefulness, practicality, or desirability of the product to
users or consumers.
1 0 3
To establish a products liability claim based on inadequate design in North
Carolina, a plaintiff must prove that, at the time the product left the manufac-
turer's control, the manufacturer unreasonably failed to adopt a safer, practical,
feasible, and otherwise reasonable alternative design. The plaintiff must also
prove that the alternative could have been reasonably adopted, preventing or
substantially reducing the risk of harm without substantially impairing the use-
fulness, practicability, or desirability of the product."°
Under Texas law, a claimant alleging a design defect must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that there was a safer alternative design and that
the defect was a cause of the injury.1 ° 5 A safer alternative design is defined as:
(1) a design that in reasonable probability would have prevented or signifi-
cantly reduced the risk of the claimant's personal injury without impairing the
product's utility; and (2) was economically and technologically feasible at the
timethe product left the control of the manufacturer.'0 6 In addition, the Texas
Supreme Court recently held that the Texas statute "reflects the trend in our
common-law jurisprudence of elevating the availability of a safer alternative
design from a factor to be considered in the risk-utility analysis to a requisite
element of a cause of action for defective design." ' 7
We agree that evidence related to risk-utility balancing, which may include proof that a practica-
ble and feasible design alternative was available, will not always be necessary to prove that a
product's design is defective and unreasonably dangerous . However, because the parties did
not dispute that evidence related to risk-utility balancing was necessary in this case, we leave for
another day the question under what circumstances ORS 30.920 requires a plaintiff to support a
product liability design-defect claim with evidence related to risk-utility balancing of the kind
discussed above.
102 Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f) (1999); see also Wolf v. Stanley Works, 757 So. 2d 316,
320 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
103 Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(0; see also Wolf, 757 So. 2d at 320.
1o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6(b) (2003); see also Dewitt v. Eveready Battery Co., Inc., 550
S.E.2d 511 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); Evans v. Evans, 569 S.E.2d 303, 309 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002).
105 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 82.001-.006 (Vernon 2003).
106 Id.
107 Hernandez, 2 S.W.3d at 256-57. The court cited numerous Texas court opinions to
support this proposition. The court further stated that the Restatement (Third), as well as
most jurisdictions, also make a RAD a prerequisite to design-defect liability.
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Although these statutes do not refer specifically to the Restatement's
requirement of a RAD, their requirements are either identical or even more
stringent than the Restatement (Third). Therefore, these statutes strengthen
support for the Restatement's risk-utility analysis.
C. Jurisdictions that Reject or Criticize the Restatement's Risk- Utility
Analysis
The following jurisdictions have expressly rejected or criticized the
Restatement's risk-utility analysis. However, some of these same courts have
positively recognized the usefulness of presenting a reasonable alternative
design.'o 8 Therefore, despite some criticism, even those courts most hotly con-
testing the Restatement's risk-utility analysis find usefulness in its RAD
requirement.
1. Illinois
In a 2002 opinion, an Illinois appellate court yielded to Illinois Supreme
Court precedent, despite the dissent's urge to follow the Restatement (Third) in
determining whether a reasonable and safer alternative design existed at the
time of manufacture.' 0 9 Because the test introduced by the Illinois Supreme
Court placed the burden of proof on the defendant, the appellate court con-
cluded that "until the Illinois Supreme Court determines otherwise, we believe
the rule of law in Illinois is that evidence of alternative design feasibility is
relevant and admissible ... but it is not an essential element...",' "
By expressly rejecting the dissent's proposal, the most recent opinion on
point from Illinois also rejected the Restatement (Third). However, given its
statements, it is likely that the court was merely obeying principles of stare
decisis. Should the Illinois Supreme Court decide to adopt the Restatement's
risk-utility analysis, the appellate court would undoubtedly follow suit.
2. Kansas
The Supreme Court of Kansas explicitly rejected the Restatement (Third)
in Delaney v. Deere and Co.,' 11 largely because of the RAD requirement and
exclusive reliance on a risk-utility analysis in design defect cases.' 12 In doing
so, the court noted that, nearly twenty years earlier, "[t]his court adopted the
consumer expectations test set forth in Comment i of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, § 402A as the standard for measuring design defects in Kansas."" 3
The court recognized that "the consumer expectations test has its failings"
' 1 4
108 See Delaney v. Deer & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000) ("Evidence of a reasonable
alternative design may be introduced but is not required."); Vautour v. Body Masters Indus.,
Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1183 (N.H. 2001) ("While proof of an alternative design is relevant in a
design defect case, it should be neither a controlling factor nor an essential element that must
be proved in every case.").
1o Wortel v. Somerset Indus., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1211, 1226-27 (IIl. App. Ct. 2002).
110 Id. at 1224.
"1 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000).
112 ld.
113 Id. at 944.
114 Id.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
and a risk-utility analysis is valid as a guide in determining the expectations of
consumers in complex cases. 1 5 However, the court bound itself by its own
outdated precedent. Although the court attempted to justify its weak reasoning
using criticisms voiced by legal scholars regarding the Restatement (Third), it
failed to provide any substantive rationale for its conclusion. 116
3. Maryland
In a Maryland product liability action against a handgun manufacturer, the
Maryland Court of Appeals expressed its reluctance to cast aside its existing
jurisprudence in favor of the Restatement (Third) approach to design defects." 7
Similar to the Kansas Supreme Court's rationale, the Maryland court rational-
ized its decision entirely on its own precedent and the controversy that "contin-
ues to surround the risk-utility standard articulated for design defect cases in
Section 2 of the Restatement (Third)."' 18 Again, the "controversy" to which
the court referred stems from the criticisms voiced by various legal
commentators. 119
4. New Hampshire
In Vautour v. Body Master Sports Industries, Inc.,' 20 the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire declined to adopt Section 2(b) of the Restatement
(Third).12 1 Although New Hampshire employs a risk-utility analysis, it consid-
ers proof of an alternative design as relevant, but not as a controlling or essen-
tial element that must be proved in every case. 122 Again citing the considerable
controversy surrounding the RAD requirement,123 the court concluded it was
satisfied with the risk-utility test it currently applies because it protects the
interests of both consumers and manufacturers in design defect cases. 1
24
5. Wisconsin
Contrary to the other states, the Wisconsin court rationalized its decision
to reject the Restatement (Third) Section 2(b) by examining public policy goals
behind products liability law. 125 The court noted that the seller of the product
can distribute the cost of risk by passing costs along to consumers, and that the
manufacturer has the greatest ability to control the risk. 12 6 For these reasons,
the court reemphasized that foreseeability of the risk of harm plays no role in
Wisconsin product liability law. Because Section 2(b) of the Restatement
(Third) incorporates foreseeability as an element of the risk-benefit test, the
115 Id.
116 Id. at 944-46.
"I Halliday v. Strum, 792 A.2d 1145, 1159 (Md. 2002).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1154-55.
120 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2001).
121 Id. at 1182.
122 Id. at 1183.
123 Id. at 1182.
124 Id. at 1184.
125 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 749 (Wis. 2001).
126 Id.
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court concluded that the Restatement's risk-utility analysis departs from its
consumer expectation test. 127
As the dissent notes, the public policy goals articulated by the majority
only make sense in manufacturing defect cases, not design defect cases. 128 A
risk-utility balancing is necessary in the design defect context because products
are not generically defective merely because they are dangerous. 129 Therefore,
even though the Wisconsin court attempted to justify its decision with more
than its own precedent and the controversy surrounding the Restatement
(Third), its policy premises are not logical or persuasive.
Despite the on-going tension, based on the rationale outlined in this sec-
tion, courts are undoubtedly beginning to understand the virtues of the Restate-
ment's risk-utility analysis, a perception that the Reporters predicted would
happen over time.' 3 °
V. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the debate over the Restatement's risk-utility
analysis will not cease in the near future. However, as this Note has explained,
the rationale used to support the Restatement's risk-utility analysis is indeed
commonsensical and sufficient to persuade an increasing number of courts. As
delineated above, courts from over thirteen different states have expressly
accepted, implicitly accepted, or at least positively recognized the Restate-
ment's risk-utility analysis. Thus, an increasing number of jurisdictions recog-
nize the usefulness of the Restatement's risk-utility analysis, which will
encourage its further acceptance among other jurisdictions.
127 Id. at 751.
128 Id. at 765.
129 Id.
130 James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help Settle Troubled
Waters?, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1257, 1266-67 (1993).
